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Pretrial Detention in Kentucky:
An Analysis of the Impact of House Bill 463
During the First Two Years of Its Implementation
Robert Veldman'
INTRODUCTION

criminal law reform for Kentucky,
the recently
ITHIN
commonly
known aspassed
Houseexpansive
Bill 463,2 were provisions that significantly
altered the state's pretrial detention policy. 'Ihe legislation mandated that courts
utilize evidence-based pretrial risk assessments in their bail determinations,'
expanded pretrial monitoring programs, 4 and instituted bail credit
requirements.s These changes were designed to reduce the financial burden of
the state's soaringjail population and increase public safety.' As can be expected
with sweeping reforms, some provisions, particularly the pretrial bond decision
procedure, have presented new challenges to Kentucky courts.
After passage of House Bill 463, making a decision on what type of bond
to apply requires a judge to consider a means-tested pretrial report with
recommendations for release.7 The judge may use her discretion and ignore the
report's suggestions upon a finding that the defendant presents a flight risk
or a danger to himself or others.! This second part of the decision process was
intended to be a "safety valve" that preserved the court's traditionally broad
discretion on bond decisions. The language in the "safety valve" portion of the
statute implies that this new standard to be used is the same standard set forth
by Kentucky courts for judges making ordinary bond decisions before passage

W

I J.D. candidate 2014. Thank you to Professor Robert G. Lawson, Professor Allison Connelly,
Tara Boh Klute, Mark Heyerly, and Dina Veldman for their help in assembling this Note.
2 Public Safety and Offender Accountability Act, H.B. 463, 2on Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ky. 2oni) [hereinafter H.B. 463]. For a full description of changes affecting pretrial policy, see TARA
BOH KLUTE & MARK HEYERLY, Ky. PRETRIAL SERVS., REPORT ON IMPACT OF HOUSE BILL 463:
OUTCOMES, CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4-6 (2012).
3 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 43.066

(West Supp. 2013) (codifying H.B. 463).

4 See id
5 § 43L.o66(5)(a) (codifying H.B. 463 § 48(4)(a)).
6 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 196.288(1) (West Supp. 2013) (codifying H.B. 463 § 68(1))
(requiring documentation of cost reduction by amendments in the bill including those to KRS
Section 431); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.007(l) (West Supp. 2013) (codifying H.B. 463 § i(i)) (stating
that the legislation's primary objective is public safety and offender accountability).
7 Id. § 43i.066(2).
8 See id. § 43.o66(4)-(5).
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of House Bill 463, the Public Safety and Offender Accountability Act.' Such
language confuses the standards to be used for deciding the type of bond to
apply and deciding the amount of bail to apply, if applicable.
Unfortunately, the confusion has allowed the subjective exception to
swallow the objective rule in some courtrooms and parts of the state.o This
has resulted in a significant disparity in bond determinations from courtroom
to courtroom. Even when used as intended, the safety valve standard is
duplicative and illogical. The confusion is evidenced by studies conducted to
measure the legislation's effect on release rates and public safety. Since the Act's
passing, pretrial release numbers have increased marginally but not uniformly.
The standard for the use of the "safety valve" provision should be clarified to
negate the confusion that has led to the present disparity. To improve the bill's
effectiveness and keep with the legislative intent, judicial discretion should be
curtailed to prevent the dominance of subjective decision making.
Part I of this Note traces the background of House Bill 463 and explains
the legislation's past and purpose. Part II fully defines the current Kentucky
law governing pretrial bond determinations and illuminates inconsistencies
and shortcomings. Part III uses pretrial release numbers from 2011 through
2013 to describe the application of the Act from its passage to the present and
demonstrate how the bill has affected the state's jail population awaiting trial.
This Part also examines subsequent amendments to the legislation and identifies
problems with the law's implementation, as state statistics illustrate that courts
have not applied the reforms completely or uniformly. Part IV discusses various
legal issues surrounding House Bill 463's implementation and other parts of
Kentucky's bond decision law. Finally, Part V suggests potential amendments to
existing standards within the Public Safety and Offender Accountability Act.

I.

THE LEGAL CONTEXT FOR

HouSE BILL 463

A. GeneralBackgroundInformation on PretrialIncarceration

In the 1950s academics began developing risk assessment instruments that
attempted to accurately predict individual defendants' proclivity for flight and
dangerousness by evaluating uniform characteristics. 1 The ultimate goal was to
use objective, statistically tested information to recommend release conditions
for arrestees, rather than allow judges to make decisions based solely upon gut

9 Abraham v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W2d 152,157-58 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (finding that the trial
court judge made no finding as to whether releasing the defendant on his own recognizance would
reasonably assure his appearance at trial and listing relevant factors that inform setting the amount
of bail including: the nature of the offenses, past criminal record, reasonably anticipated conduct if
released, present address, marital status, employment record, and the financial ability to give bail).
10 See KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, at ii.
1 CYNTHIA A. MAMALIAN, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF PRETRIAL
RISK ASSESSMENT 7 (2011).
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instinct after a cursory review of the limited information provided at the initial
appearance. Academics developing the risk assessment instruments collected
information through interviews with defendants before their initial court
appearance and by compiling defendants' legal history. Organizations would
analyze the assembled information and make bond recommendations to courts
based upon objective, predictive factors. Relevant predictive factors included
prior failures to appear in court (FTA's), prior arrests while released on bail,
community and family ties, prior criminal record, educational level, and past
substance abuse.12
One of the first pretrial organizations to apply available research was the
Vera Institute in 1961."'Their Manhattan Bail Project developed the Vera Point
Scale, which used information previously unavailable to judges, such as strength
of family and community ties, to identify those defendants who were likely
follow the requirements of their pretrial release and to return to court, even
without monetary release conditions.14 Though the Vera Point Scale was not
empirically based, it paved the way for more jurisdictions to adopt a scientific
approach to pretrial release over time.s
In addition to providing accurate predictive information and
recommendations, pretrial agencies established non-financial release options
that judges could utilize. "Until the 1960s, the Courts relied almost exclusively
on the traditional money bail system."' 6 A defendant could only be released in
three ways: on his own recognizance, on unsecured money bail, or on secured
money bail. Two landmark studies, Arthur Beeley's study of bail in Chicago
in 1927 and Caleb Foote's study of the bail system in Philadelphia in 1954,
exposed the inequities of the old "money bail only" system.17 The studies
revealed the disparate impact of the money bail system on the poor." They
also illustrated that defendants without financial means were more likely to be
held pending trial regardless of the actual risk they posed." For these reasons,
pretrial organizations developed monitoring and supervision programs that
allowed defendants who would have otherwise been assigned money bail under
the old regime to be released before their trial. These monitoring programs

12

Id.

13 Id. at7-8.
14 Id. at I8.
15 Id. at i9.

16

MARIE VANNOSTRAND,

CRIME AND JUSTICE INST. & THE NATL INST. OF CORR., LEGAL

AND EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES: APPLICATIONS OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES, LAWS, AND RESEARCH
TO THE FIELD OF PRETRIAL SERVICES 2 (2007).
17

Id. (citing

ARTHUR BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO (new impression

ed.

1966));

Note, CompellingAppearance in Court:Administration ofBail in Philadelphia,io2 U. PA. L. REV. IO3I
(1954)).
18 Id.
19

Id
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functioned similarly to probation and parole programs for defendants who had
not been sentenced.
Kentucky has been a leader in these types of progressive pretrial policies.
The legislature created a statewide pretrial program in 1976 and prohibited
controversial commercial bail bonding services.2 0 It is still one of the few states
where the questionable practice is illegal.2 ' The Kentucky Pretrial Services
Agency is also the nation's only statewide pretrial services department that is
funded under the state's court system and made available to all counties. 22 Its risk
assessment instrument was empirically validated in 2010 by the independent
JFA Institute.2 3 Now, all recommendations given to judges regarding release
decisions are statistically supported and verified in accordance with House Bill
463's requirements. 24
Despite the proliferation of pretrial agencies, recent national and state
detention statistics are alarming. As much as $9 billion was spent in 2011 on
pretrial detention in the United States. 2' From June 2010 to June 2011,735,601
people were confined in county and city jails nationwide. 26 Of that population,
more than six in ten inmates were awaiting trial. 27 This level of incarceration is
not the historical norm. The average daily jail population rose 26.5% nationally
from 2000 to 2008.28 During the same period, the rated capacity of jails only
rose 22.2%.29 This resulted in the percentage of occupied space rising from 92%
to 94.8% during that time period."o
This is not to say the growth in detention was uniform between pretrial
detainees and sentenced individuals. Though the population of sentenced
inmates grew from 1990 to 2008, it did so at a relatively glacial pace of 50%,

20 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 431.510 (West 2006); JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., THE
KENTUCKY PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT VALIDATION (2010).

JFA

INST.,

21 Four states have abolished commercial bail bonds: Illinois, Kentucky, Oregon, and

Wisconsin. Adam Liptak,American Exception: IllegalGlobally, Bailfor Profit Remains in US., N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/zoo8/l/29/us/29bail.html?pagewanted=al&r=o.
22 MAMALIAN, supra note ii, at 19.
23 AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 20; MAMALIAN,
24 See

Ky.

REv. STAT. ANN.

supranote

§ 446.010(35) (West

ii,

at 19.

Supp. 2013).

U.S. SHOULD END THE PRACTICE OF USING
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/

25 JUSTICE POLICY INST., BAIL FAIL: WHY THE
MONEY FOR BAIL 3

(Sept.

2012),

bailfail.pdf (citing Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., Address at the National Symposium on Pretrial Justice
(June I, 2011)).
26 TODD

D.

MINTON, U.S. DEPT OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTIcS, NCJ 23 7 961,JAIL

INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2011 - STATISTICAL TABLES I (2012). To add perspective, over 11.8 million

people were admitted to local jails during the same time period. Id. at 327 Id. at I.
28

John Clark, The Impact ofMoney Bail on jailBed Usage, AMERICAN

at 47, 48.
2 9 Id.
30 Id.

JAILS,

July-Aug.

2010,
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as compared to the pretrial population." The pretrial population increased
a surprising 150% in those same eighteen years. 32 Therefore, the increase in
pretrial incarceration largely drove the increase in overall jail populations seen
in the previous decades. 3
These numbers would be troubling independently, but are more worrisome
given their extensive effects on defendants. People held before their trial may
lose their job or their housing due to absence.3 4 Health insurance for themselves
or their families might be affected.3 1 Children of detained defendants may have
to relocate and/or change schools.36 Additionally, incarcerated defendants are
more likely to be convicted of a felony when they are eventually tried, receive a
sentence of incarceration, and be given longer sentences than defendants who
were released before their trial.37 Finally, pretrial detention adds more coercion
to an already coercive process. One study estimated that up to 50% of innocent
defendants pled guilty in order to avoid a potential maximum sentence.3 1
Detention prior to trial increases the already high likelihood that defendants
will plead guilty.3 9
The costs of the marked trend of increased pretrial detention and the high
number of jail occupants has begun to take its toll on state budgets that were
already strapped by the recent economic downturn."
B. Task Forceon the Penal Code and ControlledSubstancesAct Report
Unfortunately, Kentucky has not escaped the national trend of increased
pretrial incarceration. In January 2011, the Task Force on the Penal Code and
Controlled Substances Act ("Task Force") released a report detailing the state
of corrections in Kentucky.41 The report painted a particularly bleak picture of
incarceration in the Commonwealth. From 2000 to 2009, Kentucky's inmate
population grew 45% while the crime rate is at the same level recorded in
1974.42 This increase in incarceration ballooned corrections spending from

31 The sentenced population rose from 200,000 to 300,000. Id
32 Id.

33 See id.
34 JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 25, at 3.

35 Id

36 See id.
37 Id
38 Id.
39 NATL

AssN OF

PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, STANDARDS ON PRETRIAL RELEASE 9 n.1 (3 d

ed. 2004).
40 See LEGIs. RESEARCH COMMN, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE PENAL CODE AND

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, Research Memorandum No. 5o6, at I (Ky. 2on).
41

Id.

42 See id.
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$140 million in fiscal year 1990 to $440 million in fiscal year 2010 43-a 214%
increase in required funding.4 At the time, the state prison system was at
capacity and local jails held one-third of sentenced state prisoners. 45 Despite
this increase in penal spending, the state did not see an equivalent return on its
escalating investment. Recidivism rates held relatively steady and the crime rate
dropped less than the national average during the same time period. 46 Looking
forward, the report estimated that inaction in the face of this fiscal crisis would
cost Kentucky $161 million by 2020 and leave the holding capacity of the
state's prisons wanting. 47
The Task Force set forth an extensive list of recommended actions
calculated to "contain prison growth and corrections spending while protecting
public safety."48 Amongst its suggested solutions, the report advocated for the
use of data to inform key incarceration decisions, 49 encouraged implementing
strategies to boost the chances that an inmate will successfully transition to
the community upon release,so supported improving parole and probation
supervision5 1 , recommended modernizing the Controlled Substances Act,52
and argued for redefining success as reduction in recidivism and criminal
behavior.53 The main focus of the suggested reforms was on drug crimes and
post-sentencing apparatuses. However, the report also argued for an expanded
role for Pretrial Services to reduce costs and increase public safety.54 More
specifically, the goal of this expansion of the agency's duties was to decrease the
number of locally incarcerated defendants awaiting trial, rather than decrease
the overall penal population at the state level. The Task Force's report argued
that the availability of beds in local jails would be increased and the societal cost
of incarceration would be reduced.55

43 Id. Though this Note focuses on pretrial detention, which is funded by local government,
the statistics cited illustrate the alarming growth of incarceration generally.
44 Id
45 Id. at 7. See generally Robert G. Lawson, Difficult Times in Kentucky Corrections-Aftershocks
of a 'Tough on Crime"Philosophy, 93 Ky. L.J. 305 (2004) (discussing the intertwined state and local
corrections system in Kentucky).
46 LEGs. RESEARCH COMMN, supra note 4o, at 7.
47 Id. at 8.
48 Id. at 7.
49 Id. at II.
50 Id. at 12.
51 Id. at 1352 Id. at 17.
53 Id. at 59.
54 Id. at II,

13, 21.

55 Id. at 16, 21. See also Marcia Johnson & Luckett Anthony Johnson, Bail: Reforming Policies
to Address Overcrowded jails, the Impact of Race on Detention, and Community Revival in Harris
County, Texas, 7 Nw. J. L. & Soc. PoL'y 42, 73 (2012) (discussing generally the costs of incarcerating
individuals).
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C. House Bill 463
In the 2011 General Assembly, the Kentucky Legislature passed House Bill
463, also known as the Public Safety and Offender Accountability Act, with the
aim of reducing the ever-increasing cost of corrections while improving public
safety.s" Estimated to save the Commonwealth $422 million over ten years,s"
the bill was sponsored by eleven Representatives, including House Judiciary
Committee Chair John Tilley (D-Hopkinsville); researched by the Task Force
with the help of the Pew Research Center; and supported by Governor Steve
Beshear.5 Many of the reforms contained within the bill followed the Task
Force's recommendations. The overarching legislative intent was to implement
evidence-based decision making in order to decrease spending and increase
public safety. 9 Like the Task Force report, House Bill 463 aimed to achieve
its goals primarily by altering drug laws and post-incarceration processes.
Reforms included changing the probation and parole decision-making process,
modernizing drug crime sentences, and requiring cite and release police
procedures for some crimes.6
The legislation also followed the Task Force's advice by implementing
important changes in Kentucky's pretrial detention policy. The Act required
Pretrial Services to use a "research-based, validated assessment tool" to measure
a defendant's flight risk and public dangerousness.6" Courts would now be
required to consider the pretrial risk assessment in their bond decision process,
where previously they were not mandated to examine the instrument or its
recommendations. 62 All defendants charged with certain misdemeanors and
given money bail were presumed to have the amount of their bail limited
by the maximum fine and costs. 6' Defendants charged with crimes that may
result in presumptive probation were required to be released on their own
recognizance. 64 Additionally, most defendants held on money bail would be
presumed to be eligible for a bail credit of $100 per day toward his or her bail
56 See Gov. Besbear Signs Landmark CorrectionsReform Bill, KYJUST.

& PUB.

SAFETY CABINET,

http://justice.ky.gov/ (last updated Dec. 5, 2013). Actual vote in the House was 97-2 and the Senate
passed the bill unanimously. H.B. 463, 201n Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., Vote History (Ky. 20u)
availableat http://www.1rc.ky.gov/record/uiRS/HB463/votehistory.pdf
57 Gov. Beshear Signs Landmark CorrectionsReform Bill, supra note 56.

58 See H.B. 463, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 20H); LEGIs. RESEARCH COMMN, supra
note 40, at i; Gov. Beshear Signs Landmark CorrectionsReform Bill, supra note 56.
59 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.007(I), (4) (West Supp. 2013) (codifying H.B. 463).
60 DamonPreston,Changesin CriminalLaworCriminaProcedureinHB463,TH
EADVOCATE (Ky.
Dep't of Pub. Advocacy),June 2011, at 1-3, availableathttp://dpa.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/ 4iB 7BBD 7 -

FA3D-49CF-99B4-56985oEoFBA2/o/Advocateuneo6o3iFINAL 4PAGE.pdf
61 Id. at I.
62 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 431.066(2) (West Supp. 2013).
63 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 431-525(2) (West Supp. 2013). This requirement can be negated by a
finding of risk of flight or dangerousness. Id. § 431.525(6).
64 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 218A.I 3 S(I) (West Supp. 2013).
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amount."s If a judge decided to override any of these presumptions upon a
subjective finding of dangerousness or risk of ffight, she would have to provide
written documentation supporting her decision.6
This was a marked change from the old bail decision processes. Previously, a
judge was able to make a bond decision based upon a wide range of criteria, and
then choose from any bond condition legally available." Her decision would be
reviewed by the extremely favorable "abuse of discretion" standard on appeal.6 1
This led to significant difficulty when challenging any bond decision made at
the trial court level. 61 Ihe judge would now be required to make specific findings
on the record, thereby preserving issues for appeal and giving appellate courts
presumptions to fall back on when remanding trial court bond decisions. 0 The
abuse of discretion standard would still apply, but the increased information on
appeal would be beneficial to defendants challenging their bond.n
D. Reaction to House Bill 463
Passage and implementation of House Bill 463's substantial changes was met
with understandable resistance, despite widespread bipartisan political support.72
Unsurprisingly, much of the documented resistance came from prosecutors and
law enforcement personnel. 7 There has also been anecdotal evidence of judges
resisting the implementation of the legislation.74 The passage of House Bill 54

65 § 431.066(5)(a).
66 Id. § 431.o66( 5)(b), (6).
67 See Brian Scott West, Changes in PretrialRelease from HB 463: "The New Penal Code
and Controlled Substances Act", THE ADVOCATE (Ky. Dep't of Pub. Advocacy), Aug. 20n1, at 3,
available at http://dpa.kygov/NR/rdonlyres/EE 4 n 34-D 7 B8- 45oF-B7 7E-o 72659 64 oB6B/o/
AdvocateAugustFINAL 4 page.pdf.
68 See Long v. Hamilton, 467 S.W2d 139, 141 (Ky. 197). The abuse of discretion standard has
been questioned in the wake of House Bill 463, but courts have not explicitly overruled Long since
the new legislation. See B. Scott West, Top 1o FAQ's When LitigatingHB 463 PretrialRelease on
Behalfofthe Accused, in CRIMINAL LAW REFoRM: THE FIRST YEAR OF HB 463 13, 21 (2012).

69 See West, Changes in PretrialReleasefrom HB 463, supranote 67, at 370 See id.
71 See id. (arguing that HB 463 "has breathed new life into the presumption of innocence").
72 See KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, at 4, IL

73 "But Commonwealth's Attorney Edison Banks says this bill is creating less punishment for
more crimes.'We had to go back and redo eighty-some indictments because they were either no
longer felonies or the penalties are greatly reduced or because it was mandatory probation for first
and second offenses,'said Banks. Law enforcement agencies can not arrest for the same crimes that
they used to. On Monday, Hazard Police officials say they could not arrest a suspect on drug charges
due to House Bill 463.'Its [sic] of course misdemeanor stuff at that point, and he had to cite and
release and confiscate the drugs and let them go,' said Hazard Police Chief Minor Allen." Katie
Roach, Law Enforcement, Attorneys Talk About HB 463 Effects, WYMT MOUNTAIN NEws (Feb.
27, 2012), http://www.wkyt.com/wymt/home/headlines/Law-enforcement-attorneystalkabout
HB_ 463_effects_1 4o6 4 814 3.html.
74 See Op-Ed, A Good Report; THE INDEPENDENT ONLINE (Aug. 23, 2012), http://
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to amend House Bill 463 (the parts relevant for this discussion were codified
in KRS section 431.066) also evidences this resistance." Despite the obvious
legislative intent to require consideration of the pretrial risk assessment in the
bond decision, some courts refused to consider the report's recommendations
based on a drafting error that resulted in explicit language not being inserted in
the original version of the Act. 6 Resistance after implementation of reform is
not unique to Kentucky, nor corrections reform in general."
Different theories explain this type of well-documented resistance. Some
sources have identified and coined the term "local legal culture" to explain why
some courts perform differently than others.7 Court culture is defined as the
expectations and beliefs of judges and court administrators about how work
should get done." Any legislation counter to a jurisdiction's local legal culture
would undoubtedly meet resistance. This particular legislation completely
altered the bond decision process by abridging the judges' formerly broad
discretion in addition to decreasing the overall punitive effect of the justice
system.
Substituting objective decision making for subjective decision making has
been met with resistance in other seemingly unrelated fields. Pretrial and baseball
"share the common plight of being social domains in which irrational practices,
based on unsystematic observation and 'common sense,' have been enshrined
with legitimacy."s0 Defense ofthese practices, and related attempts to undermine
reform, have been referred to as "knowledge destruction techniques."" Some of
the cited resistance to House Bill 463 could be characterized in such a manner.

dailyindependent.com/opinion/a685 974 052/A-good-report; Editorial, Kentucky Must Follow
Through on Corrections Law, COURIER-JOURNAL.COM (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.courier-journal.
com/article/201209o7/OPINIONOI/ 3 090 7002/.
75 Damon Preston, Updates to 2on HB 463 (202 House Bill54 ), THE ADVOCATE (Ky. Dept
of Pub. Advocacy), July 2012, at I, availableat http://dpa.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/F 3 4E8F 4 C- 5 o8Danalysis of
4F 7 B-AA3A-05x 4 A8o 4o86/o/AdvocateJulyFINALo 7 I212 4 PAGEreduced.pdf For an
a similar problem in another state and the recommendation for an increase in the reliance on
pretrial assessments, see Johnson &Johnson, supra note 5, at 78-79.
76 See Preston, Updates to 201r HB 463 (2052 House Bill54 ), supra note 75,at I.
77 See Francis T.Cullen et al.,EightLessonsfrom Moneyball: ibeHigh Cost oflgnoringEvidenceBased Corrections,4 VICnIs & OFFENDERS 197, 210-11 (2009).
78 MAMALIAN, supra note ii, at 24.

79 Id
80 Timothy P Cadigan, Evidence-Based Practices in Federal Pretrial Services, 72 FED.
PROBATION, No. 3, Sept. 2008, at 87, 87 (quoting Cullen et al., supra note 77, at 197) (internal
quotation marks omitted) available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/federalcourts/pps/
fedprob/2oo8-o9/iSevidence.based-practice.html.
81 Cullen et al, supra note 77, at 208. For a local example, see infra notes 225-28 and
accompanying text.
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Other sources argue that the process has become the punishment in some
lower courts.82
In the lower courts, it is the cost of being caught up in the criminal justice
system itself that is often most bothersome to defendants accused of petty
offenses, and it is this cost which shapes their subsequent course of action
once they are entrapped by the system. . . . The time, effort, money, and
opportunities lost as a direct result of being caught up in the system can
quickly come to outweigh the penalty that issues from adjudication and
sentence. 83

By simplifying the pretrial process and directing non-financial releases,
House Bill 463 effectively removed a portion of the perceived punishment for
offenders. 4

II.

CURRENT LAW

A. PresentLaw on PretrialBond Determinations

In Kentucky, a person arrested by police officers and charged with a crime is
transferred into corrections' custody. All defendants must have a bond set by a
judge within twenty-four hours of arrest unless they have been charged with a
capital offense.s This may be done telephonically, if there is not an opportunity
to physically see a judge within the allotted time period. If the defendant
was not released or bonded out, then she would be presented to a judge for
her initial appearance." She would be informed of her constitutional rights,
enter her plea, have counsel appointed if she was indigent, and have her bond
conditions reviewed by a judge." At the end of the appearance, the defendant's
next court hearing is set.
House Bill 463 did not change the "steps" a defendant goes through
post-arrest, but it did substantially alter the procedure utilized at the bond
decision phases of the process. After passage of House Bill 463, the procedure is

82 MAMALIAN, supra note iI, at 24-25 & n.68 (citing M.M. FEELY, THE PROCESS IS THE
PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 30-31 (1979)).

83 Id. at 25 n.68.
84 It is worth noting that "pretrial costs do not distinguish between innocent and guilty;
they are borne by all, by those whose cases are nulled or dismissed as well as by those who are
pronounced guilty."Id. Therefore the process should never be the punishment.
85 See Ky. CONsT. § 16; Ky. R. CRIM. P. 4.02(1) (excluding capital offenses from bail
eligibility); Kentucky Supreme Court Order 2012-12, Emergency Suspension of I2-hour time
restriction imposed by RCrs 4.20(5), available at http://courts.ky.gov/courts/supreme/Rules
Procedures/20x122.pdf (ordering the twelve hour requirement for bond determinations be extended
to twenty-four hours due to budget constraints). The twenty-four hour requirement will revert to
twelve hours on June 30, 2014 absent fusrther orders of the Court. Kentucky Supreme Court Order
2013-08, Amendments to the Rules of Administrative Procedure AP Part XIV, Pretrial Services,
availableat http://courts.ky.gov/courts/supreme/RulesProcedures/2os308.pdf.
86 Ky. R. CRIM. P. 3.02(3).
87 See id.; Ky. R. CRIM. P3.05; Ky. R. CRIM. P. 3 .07.
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as follows: In determining what type of bond will be assigned, every defendant
is presumed to be able to be released on his or her own recognizance." From
that starting point, "the court shall consider whether the defendant constitutes
a flight risk, is unlikely to appear for trial, or is likely to be a danger to the public
if released,"when deciding what type of release conditions to assign." The court
must consider Pretrial Services' objective risk assessment on the individual
defendant in making this determination.90 The assessment will contain extensive
information that was collected prior to the proceedings through an interview
and investigation." This information would include the defendant's residency
history, work status, current charge, legal status, any substance abuse history, any
prior misdemeanor or felony convictions, any prior violent crime convictions,
any prior failures to appear, mental health history, and any prior escape
convictions.9 2 Pretrial Services will use this to recommend a release decision for
every defendant that has had his information verified by a third-party." Each
category of information mentioned above is weighted with different points. 94
A defendant's point total determines whether he represents a low, moderate,
or high risk of flight and/or danger.95 Pretrial Services recommends that a low
risk defendant be released on his own recognizance with no conditions pending
trial. 96 They recommend a moderate risk defendant be released on his own
recognizance with pretrial supervision conditions.97 A high-risk defendant's
bail decision is left up to the discretion of the judge."
After considering Pretrial Services' recommendation for the type of bail,
the judge can choose to ignore that objective assessment if she subjectively
finds that such a release would not reasonably assure the appearance of the
defendant, or if the defendant represents a flight risk or danger to the public."
KRS section 431.066, the codified version of certain parts of House Bill 463,
states that the judge must consider the factors listed in KRS section 431.525 in
making this determination, which include: bail sufficient to insure compliance;
88 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 431.520 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013); Kv. R. CRIM. P 4 .o.
89 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43.066(2) (West Supp. 2013).
90 Id. In zozz, the original language of H.B. 463, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2011),
codified in Ky. REV. STAT. section 43.o66(2), was amended to clarify that judges are required to
consider the pretrial assessment for "verified and eligible defendants." This was the legislators'
intent, but courts were not following the spirit of the law. H.B. 54, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ky. 2011); see Preston, Updates to 2oii HB 463 (2012 House Bill 54 ), supra note 75, at I.
91 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 431.515

(West Supp. 2013).

92 See KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, app. B.

93 Id. app. B, at 3. See also Ky. R. CRIM. P. 4.o6.
94 See KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, app. B, at 2.
95 See id. at 3.
96 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 431.066(3) (West Supp. 2013); KLUTE &HEYERLY, supra note
B, at 3 .
97 § 43L.o66(4); KLUTE & HEYERLY, supranote 2, app. B, at 3.
98 KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, app. B, at 399 § 431.066; Ky. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 431-520 (West Supp. 2013).
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bail that is not oppressive; bail commensurate with the nature of the offense
charged, considerate of the past criminal acts and reasonably anticipated
conduct of the defendant if released, and considerate of the financial ability of
the defendant.'o
Other sources and the title of KRS section 431.525, "Conditions for
establishing amount of bail," indicate that the legislature, in referencing section
431.525 in section 431.066, could have confused the judge's decision to choose
the bail type and the decision to set the amount of bail."o' For example, the
oppressiveness of bail factor referred to in section 431.525 does not directly
inform the section 431.066 inquiry into the dangerousness or flight risk of
a given defendant. Additionally, other factors listed in section 431.525 are
already a part of the judge's decision on what type of bail should be ordered.
The nature of the offense and the defendant's criminal history are taken into
account in Pretrial Services'risk assessment instrument.' 02 Non-oppressive bail
and bail sufficient to ensure compliance are constitutional requirements that
apply with or without statutory implementation. 03 The only factor listed in
section 431.525 that is not already accounted for is bail "considerate of the
financial ability of the defendant."'" It is not a constitutional requirement and
not measured in the pretrial assessment. 0 5
If the judge ultimately deems a type of money bail is necessary, whether
over Pretrial Services' recommendation or not, the five factors in KRS section
431.525 must also be considered in deciding the amount of bail required.0 6 For
crimes punishable by fines only, the bail given shall not exceed the maximum
fine able to be imposed unless the judge finds the defendant to be a flight risk
or a danger to others. 0 As mentioned previously, if the judge does reject any of
pretrial's recommendations in her final determination, written reasoning must
be provided for the decision.'s
The bond decision procedure can be confusing. Factors for choosing types
of bonds and amounts of bonds overlap explicitly and implicitly. Some factors
are considered both objectively and subjectively. Some are not. However, one
common thread connects many of the decisions that are made regarding
defendants' bonds. A finding of "flight risk" or "dangerousness" can preclude
an individual from release in a number of different ways. The finding can
ioo

§ 43i.066(2);

Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 431.525(1)

(West Supp. 2013).

101 § 431-525 (emphasis added); West, Top io FAQ's When LitigatingHB 463 PretrialRelease on
Behalfofthe Accused, supranote 68, at 16.
102 KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, app. B, at 2.
103 Ky. CONsT.
104
105
106

§§ 16-17.

§ 431-525(I)(e).
Carlson v. Landon,

342 U.S. 524,545-46 (1952).

§ 431.525(I)(a)-(e); § 43x.066(2); Ky. R. CRIM.
§ 431.525(2), (6). See also Ky. R. CRIM. P. 4.6.

P 4 .16(1).

107
1o8 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4 3 i.o66( 5)(b) (West Supp. 2013);

I.C.

§ 431-525(7); discussion supraPart
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potentially deny non-financial release,'" negate limits on the amount of bail,110
and disallow bail credit that would permit a timed financial release.' These
threats can be found objectively by the risk assessment or subjectively by the
judge examining essentially the same evidence for a second time.
There is little protection from these subjective determinations beyond
appeal. Even on appeal, the appellate courts have recently allowed trial courts to
deviate from the prescribed factors when altering a defendant's bail." 2 Proving
and disproving future dangerousness (beyond mere statistical likelihoods) at the
initial appearance is also questionable at best."3'The unchecked subjective safety
valve allows unconscious and conscious biases to potentially influence the bond
decision process. It also allows for circumvention of the legislature's intended
purpose in passing House Bill 463. The current procedure is unnecessarily
duplicative and accords too much discretion to the trial courts. Effectively,
the statistically verified risk assessment is neutered by the wide scope of the
subjective exception. The results of this can be seen in the implementation of
House Bill 463 and the failure to broadly meet stated legislative goals.114

III.

IMPLEMENTATION OF

HOUSE BILL 463

A. Statewide Effects ofthe Changes
Significant amounts of data have been collected since the implementation of
House Bill 463 in June 2011 to measure its effect. The legislature's efforts have
yielded moderately positive results as a whole. Overall pretrial releases increased
from 5% to 70% of all arrested defendants in the first year of implementation."'

io9 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
110
11i

§ 431-525(2),
§

431.520

(West Supp.

2013).

(6).

431.o66(5).

112 Bolton v.Irvin,3 73 S.W 3 d 4 32,4 37 - 3 8 (Ky. 2012) (Scott,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). See McCafferty v. Commonwealth, No. 200 7 -CA-oo2 4 12-MR, 2008 WL 4182379 at *2
(Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2oo8), for a pre-H.B. 463 decision upholding a trial court's sz million bond

determination based partially on the inability to reasonably anticipate the defendant's conduct.
'This is the exact reverse of the factor set forth in Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4 31.52 5 (I)(d) allowing for
consideration of reasonably anticipated affirmative conduct.
113 See discussion infra Part IV.B.i.
114 See discussion infra Part III.B.
115 KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, at to. The release rate fell to 69% from June 2012 to June
Z013. E-mail from Mark Heyerly, Project Specialist, Ky. Admin. Office of the Courts, to Robert
Veldman (Sept. 4, 2013, 10:41 EST) (referencing 2011-2012 June to June H.B. 463 spreadsheet &
2012-2013 June to June H.B. 463 spreadsheet) (on file with author). 'This could be due to the falling
number of cases actually handled by Pretrial Services during the same timeframe.
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Non-financial releases increased from 15% to 66% of all releases since 2011.116
[From June 2011 to June 2012], [a]mong defendants assessed as low risk,
85% are released, a figure up 8% from the pre-HB 463 time period. The
release rate of moderate risk defendants has risen to 67%, up 7% from the
pre-HB rate. By comparison, the release rate of high risk defendants has
risen just slightly to 51%, suggesting more high risk defendants are perhaps
fittingly being detained."'

Additionally, the monitoring program within Pretrial Services, Monitored
Conditional Release (MCR), was assigned 40% more clients in the year
following the Act's implementation." This indicates a decrease in the use of
money bail as a condition of release.
Pretrial Services measures its service to the public by three hallmarks:
appearance rate, public safety rate, and supervision compliance rate."' The
appearance rate is the percentage of defendants released before trial who make
all scheduled court appearances.' 20 The public safety rate is "the percentage of
defendants who have not been charged with a new crime while on pretrial
release."' 21 The supervision compliance rate is "the percentage of defendants
supervised by Pretrial Services who are not charged with a violation of the
conditions of release, including making all scheduled court appearances and
who have not been charged with a new crime."' 22 In the year following House
Bill 463, the appearance rate and public safety rate increased 1% from the
same time period the previous year-an increase from 89% to 90% and 91%
to 92% respectively. 123 While these numbers fell from June 2012 to June 2013,
they must be viewed in light of the increased release rates.124 The Act's intent
was apparently being achieved.125 More detainees were being released, more
defendants were returning to court, and public safety was improving.
n16 KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, at so; E-mail from Mark Heyerly, Project Specialist, Ky.
Admin. Office of the Courts, to Robert Veldman (Sept. 4, 2013,10:41 EST) (referencing 20s-2012
June to June H.B. 463 spreadsheet) (on file with author).
17 KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, at o. These numbers remained unchanged from June 2012
to June 2013 except that the low risk release rate fell from 85% to 83%. E-mail from Mark Heyerly,
Project Specialist, Ky. Admin. Office of the Courts, to Robert Veldman (Sept. 4, 2013, 10:41 EST)
(referencing 2011-2012 June to June H.B. 463 spreadsheet) (on file with author).
118 KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, at 7.
Id at 5.
120 Id.
11g

121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 6.
124 From June 2oz to June 2013, the appearance rate fell to 87% and the public safety rate fell
to 91%. E-mail from Mark Heyerly, Project Specialist, Ky. Admin. Office of the Courts, to Robert
Veldman (Sept. 4, 2013, 1o:41 EST) (referencing 2012-2013 June to June H.B. 463 spreadsheet) (on
file with author).
125 H.B. 463 § i(i), 2on Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2011) (stating the legislature's primary
objective was public safety and offender accountability); Id. § 68(1) (requiring documentation of
cost reduction due to amendments in the bill including those to KRS section 431).
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B. StatisticalProblems with Implementation
While there have been improvements since House Bill 463's passage, there is
also room for significant progress. Statewide, 15% of defendants recommended
for release without conditions and 33% of defendants recommended for
conditional release remained incarcerated for the period between June 2011
and June 2012.126 Those numbers stayed the same or increased between June

2012 and June 2013.127
These rejections of Pretrial Service's recommendations are inefficient.Judges
are detaining low-risk individuals who are statistically more likely to appear
for court and less likely to commit crime than the average released defendant.
According to data collected by the agency, low-risk defendants in Kentucky
had an appearance and public safety rate of 94% during the two years prior to
House Bill 463.128 Simply releasing all low-risk defendants across the board,
assuming their 94% appearance and public safety rates held true, should have
resulted in an increase of those average rates from the year following the Act's
implementation-90% and 92% respectively. 129 It would have also decreased
the overall cost of incarceration.
Additionally, the 70% release rate for the state and the 66% rate for
non-financial release mean that only approximately 4% ofthe 34% ofdefendants
who receive financial bond conditions secured their release by payment of
money bail. 10 Because the remaining 30% of detainees were presumably unable
to pay the bond assigned to them,131 actual payment of bail appears to be the

126 KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2,

at 1o. Percentages referred to low and moderate risk
§ 43i.066(3)-(4) (West Supp. 2013).
127 Seventeen percent of low risk defendants were retained and 33% of moderate risk
defendants remained in custody. See E-mail from Mark Heyerly, Project Specialist, Ky. Admin.
Office of the Courts, to Robert Veldman (Sept. 16, 2013, 02:33 EST) (referencing 2012-2013June to
June H.B. 463 spreadsheet) (on file with author).
128 Moderate risk defendants have an 89% success rate and even high risk defendants only
defendants, respectively. Ky.

fail

17%

REV. STAT. ANN.

of the time. Tara Boh Klute, Release Rates Vary, Failure Rates Remain Unchanged,THE
(Ky. Dep't of Pub. Advocacy), Aug. 2011 at i (citing unpublished data from Admin.

ADVOCATE,

Office of the Courts, Div. of Pretrial Servs., PRIM database) (analyzing 527,183 cases from July I,
2009 to June 30, 2011).
129 KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, at 6.
130 See id. at to. Seventy percent is approximate given the 69% release rate from June 2012
to June 2013. E-mail from Mark Heyerly, Project Specialist, Ky. Admin. Office of the Courts, to
Robert Veldman (Sept. 16, 2013, 02:33 EST) (on file referencing 2011-2012 June to June H.B. 463
spreadsheet & 2012-2013 June to June H.B. 463 spreadsheet) (on file with author). However, the
66% non-financial release rate was the same for both time periods. KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note
2, at to; E-mail from Mark Heyerly, Project Specialist, Ky. Admin. Office of the Courts, to Robert
Veldman (Sept. 16, 2013, 02:33 EST) (referencing 2011-2012 June to June H.B. 463 spreadsheet &
2012-2013 June to June H.B. 463 spreadsheet) (on file with author).
131 This number could be somewhat lower because capital offenses are not bailable. Ky. R.
CRIM. P 4 .02(1).
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exception rather than the rule. This indicates that money bail is used as a sub
rosa means of detention, not as a means of insuring compliance upon release. 13 2
Kentucky also faced problems correctly utilizing the Monitored Conditional
Release program statewide. During the first two years after implementation,
two out of every five defendants monitored by Pretrial Services had been
recommended for unconditional release.'
That represents a significant
number of defendants who should have been placed under less restrictive
bond conditions and subsequently missed opportunities to release detained
defendants recommended for conditional release.
In response, the agency has called for stricter adherence to the risk
principle-matching a defendants' release type and conditions with that of
their risk assessment-in order to realize additional cost savings.134 Beyond
monetary losses, unnecessary pretrial monitoring has been shown to actually
decrease public safety and appearance rates. 3 s
More specifically, county-by-county statistics paint a starker picture.
Pretrial release rates across the state vary greatly."' The lowest average county
release rate in Kentucky between June 2011 and June 2013 was McCracken
County at 46.48%.' The highest average release rate over the same time period
was Russell County at 84.93%."3 These figures are not outliers. Seventy-nine

132 John S. Goldkamp, Danger andDetention:A Second GenerationofBail Reform, 76 J. CRiM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 42 (1985) (explaining sub rosa detention and how preventative detention in the

federal system sought to eliminate it).
133 From

2on1

to

2012,

43% had been recommended for unconditional release, and then

42%

from 2012 to 2013. KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, at ii; E-mail from Mark Heyerly, Project

Specialist, Ky. Admin. Office of the Courts, to Robert Veldman (Sept. 16, 2013, 02:33 EST)
(referencing 2011-2012 June to June H.B. 463 spreadsheet & 2012-2013 June to June H.B. 463
spreadsheet) (on file with author).
134 KLUTE & HEYERLY, Supra note 2, at II.
135 See Christopher T Lowenkamp et al., The Development and Validation ofa PretrialScreening

Tool, 72 FED. PROBATION, 2, 2-3 (Dec. 2008). For example, the pretrial failure rate for low-risk
defendants is 'I% to 33% higher if substance abuse treatment is added as a condition of release, 30%
to 56% higher if third-party monitoring is required, and 46% to 112% higher if location monitoring
is required. See id.
136 See infra app. A.

137 The statistics provided here are derived from averaging the statistical data provided in the
following sources: KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, app. C; E-mail from Mark Heyerly, Project
Specialist, Ky. Admin. Office of the Courts, to Robert Veldman (Sept. 16, 2013, 02:33 EST) (on file
with author).
138 The statistics provided here are derived from averaging the statistical data provided in the
following sources: KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, app. C; E-mail from Mark Heyerly, Project
Specialist, Ky. Admin. Office of the Courts, to Robert Veldman (Sept. 16, 2013,02:33 EST) (on file
with author).
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counties had an average release rate below the 69.35%139 state average and seven
counties had release rates above 80%.14o
Demographics cannot be used to justify the disparities. Counties with
similar communities had dissimilar release rates. For example, Jefferson County
released 69.54% of its 92,921 total cases from June 2011 to June 2013.141 Fayette
County, the next largest caseload, released 47.46% of its 30,356 total cases.142
Similarly, adjacent rural counties also differ greatly.143 Rockcastle County
released 74.85% of its 2,433 total cases" while Lincoln County released
53.24% of its 2,453 total cases.145
In addition, the disparities cannot be justified by improved outcomes in
the counties." Higher retention rates do not necessarily equate to better
appearance and public safety rate. For instance, the counties compared above
139 The statistics provided here are derived from averaging the statistical data provided in the
following sources: KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, app. C; E-mail from Mark Heyerly, Project
Specialist, Ky. Admin. Office of the Courts, to Robert Veldman (Sept. 6, 2013, 02:33 EST) (on file
with author).
140 The statistics provided here are derived from averaging the statistical data provided in the
following sources: KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, app. C; E-mail from Mark Heyerly, Project
Specialist, Ky. Admin. Office of the Courts, to Robert Veldman (Sept. 16, 2013, 02:33 EST) (on file
with author).Jefferson County's high case load could be "anchoring" the average thereby explaining
the large number of counties below the state average. KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, app. C; Email from Mark Heyerly, Project Specialist, Ky. Admin. Office of the Courts, to Robert Veldman
(Sept. 6, 2013, 02:33 EST) (on file with author).
141 The statistics provided here are derived from averaging the statistical data provided in the
following sources: KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, app. C; E-mail from Mark Heyerly, Project
Specialist, Ky. Admin. Office of the Courts, to Robert Veldman (Sept. 16, 2013, 02:33 EST) (on
file with author). Jefferson County has a population of 750,828 and a median household income of
$46,701. AMERICAN FACTFINDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov.
142 The statistics provided here are derived from averaging the statistical data provided in the
following sources: KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, app. C; E-mail from Mark Heyerly, Project
Specialist, Ky. Admin. Office of the Courts, to Robert Veldman (Sept. r6, 2013, 02:33 EST) (on
file with author). Fayette County has a population of 305,489 and a median household income of
$48,779. AMERICAN FACTFINDER, supra note 141.
143 Rockcastle County has a total population of z7,oo6 and a median household income of
$28,178. AMERICAN FACTFINDER, supra note 141. Lincoln County has a total population of 24,461,

and a median household income of $34,454. Id.
144 The statistics provided here are derived from averaging the statistical data provided in the
following sources: KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, app. C; E-mail from Mark Heyerly, Project
Specialist, Ky. Admin. Office of the Courts, to Robert Veldman (Sept. r6, 2013, 02:33 EST) (on file
with author).
145 The statistics provided here are derived from averaging the statistical data provided in the
following sources: See KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, app. C; E-mail from Mark Heyerly, Project
Specialist, Ky. Admin. Office of the Courts, to Robert Veldman (Sept. 16, 2013, 02:33 EST) (on file
with author).
146 See infra app. B (organizing the counties' pretrial retention rates-the inverse of the
pretrial release rate, failure to appear rates, and re-arrest rates by geographic region for 6/8/11
to 6/8/13). Statistics obtained from KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, app. C; E-mail from Mark
Heyerly, Project Specialist, Ky. Admin. Office of the Courts, to Robert Veldman (Sept. 16, 2013,
02:33 EST) (on file with author).
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have similar appearance and public safety rates.147 Very little correlation can be
found statewide.'14 Statistical analysis reveals no correlation between the release
rate and the appearance rate and a small to moderate correlation between
the release rate and the public safety rate.149 A simple visual comparison of
outcomes in the counties as compared to release rates visually illustrates the
lack of direct correlation.so
Even more specifically, some judges within certain counties have outcomes
that illustrate a failure to comply with the intent of House Bill 463. Statistics are
difficult to obtain, but it has been acknowledged that some courts "throughout
the state apply their judicial discretion frequently and rather broadly; as a result
these areas have not seen a significant decrease in their jurisdiction's release
rates.""st
IV.

LEGAL ISSUES

A. Application ofExisting Bail Law
1. The Eighth Amendment and Kentucky Bond Law.-The types of disparities
seen in the application of Kentucky bail law described above potentially violate
147 Both Jefferson County and Fayette County are in the bottom ten counties for appearance
rate-19-.78% and 16.49% respectively. Jefferson County has a 9.54% public safety rate and Fayette
County has an 8.oo% public safety rate. Rockcastle County has an appearance rate of 12.90% and
Lincoln County has an 8.27% appearance rate. Rockcastle County has a public safety rate of II.o4%
and Lincoln County has a public safety rate of 8.19%. These numbers place all counties in relative
proximity to each other as compared to other counties. The statistics provided here are derived from
averaging the statistical data provided in the following sources: KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2,

app. C; E-mail from Mark Heyerly, Project Specialist, Ky. Admin. Office of the Courts, to Robert
Veldman (Sept. 16, 203, 02:33 EST) (on file with author).
148 See KLUTE &HEYERLY, supra note 2, at 4. See also infra app. C.

149 See infra app. C. The linear trend line marks the relation between the x and y axes in both
charts. The Pearson Product-Moment Correlation coefficient is a measure of linear correlation
between two variables. It is represented by r and can range from +i to -i. A value of o represents
no association between the two variables. +/- .3 to +/- .arepresents a small correlation. +/- .5 to
+/- .3represents medium correlation. +/- i to +/- .5 represents strong correlation. Pearson ProductMoment Correlation, AERD STATISTIcs, https://statistics.laerd.com/statistical-guides/pearsoncorrelation-coefficient-statistical-guide.php (last visited Feb. 26, 2014). Here, the r for the release
rate and the FTA rate for 6/8/11 to 6/8/13 for the state of Kentucky was .o61 based off of the
data provided in the Pretrial Impact Report at Appendix C and 2013 Statistics provided by Mark
Heyerly. KLUTE & HEYERLY, supranote 2, app. C; E-mail from Mark Heyerly, Project Specialist, Ky.
Admin. Office of the Courts, to Robert Veldman (Sept. 16, ZO3, 02:33 EST) (on file with author).
The r for the same time period for the release rate and the re-arrest rate was -358. It is important
to note that a lack of correlation does not necessarily imply a lack of causation. Additionally, this
analysis is admittedly rudimentary. However, this data does tend to contradict the traditional
"tough on crime" logic. Further research would be needed to filly understand the statistics behind
this analysis. For a review of nonparametric statistics, see YA-IUN CHOU, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
536-68 (2d ed. 1975).
150 See infra apps. B-C.
151

KLUTE &

HEYERLY, supra note 2, at io.
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constitutional and state law protections against excessive bonds. "Bail set at
a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill its purpose is
'excessive.""152 Disregarding individual nuances in a case can lead to bonds not
reasonably calculated to fulfill their purpose. "Each case comprises a set of
facts and circumstances peculiar to it and there is no rule of law which will
automatically determine for every case the amount ofbail which may be required
without violation of the prohibition against excessiveness."'s Therefore, bond
decisions can become so automatic as to be unlawful.
Questions regarding the automatic application of bond decision law often
arise when bond amounts are based solely on bail schedules or court practices.
Kentucky courts have rejected these types of "one size fits all" procedures.' 54
The routine setting of high bail for certain types of offenses without regard
for the statutorily prescribed factors was held to be an abuse of the broad
discretion vested in the trial court.'s In its 1951 decision in Stack v. Boyle, the
United States Supreme Court also found that bond decisions not made upon
an individual assessment of each defendant violated the Eighth Amendment.'s
Of course, in Stack, bail's only purpose was to assure the appearance of the
accused."s' Under Kentucky law, prevention of future dangerousness is also a
permissible purpose of bail."ss
Based on the data examined above, Kentucky courts are not making
individual bond determinations. It would be a stretch to argue that Fayette
County's defendants are significantly more dangerous than Jefferson County's
defendants. Yet, a difference of eighty miles in the location of arrest could
reduce the chance of release by 25%."l hough some may argue that it is within
the judicial and prosecutorial purview to apply bond law as their community
sees fit, KRS sections 431.066 and 431.525 do not explicitly allow for such
considerations. 160 Local legal culture, the only discernible reason for the

152

Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 3 (1951).

153 Long v. Hamilton, 467 S.W.2d 139,

141 (Ky. 1971).
154 See Abraham v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 152, 157 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (rejecting a trial

court bond decision based upon the fact that s25,000 was the bond always set by the court in
theft and related cases). See e.g., Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Neely v. Sabbatine, No.
12-CI-00 4 01 (Fayette Cir. Ct. Ky. 2012) (challenging successfully an initial bail of s88,335 for a
moderate risk defendant charged with Trafficking a Controlled Substance first and second degree,
Wanton Endangerment, and Fleeing and Evading, who was found subjectively to be a flight risk
and a danger to the community then given a bail based upon a bail schedule). Neely later had his
bail reduced to a combination of lower monetary bail with pretrial monitoring conditions. Id.
155 See Abraham, 565 S.W2d at 158. But see Bolton v. Irvin, 373 S.W 3 d 432, 436-37 (Ky. 2012)
(Scott,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
156 See Stack, 342 U.S. at 4 (citation omitted).
157 See discussion supra Part IV.B.i.
158 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43.066(2) (West Supp. 2013).
159 See KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, app. C.

160 See discussion supraPart II.A.
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disparities, 16 ' should not affect bond decisions in such an egregious manner
when there is a statewide statute on point.'6 2 It is clear that some jurisdictions
are using money bail as a means of sub rosa detention, utilizing the subjective
exception in KRS section 431.066 that arguably allows judges to override
Pretrial Services' recommendation for release. Individual defendants are not
having their bonds set as individuals, but as individuals from a certain county.
Therefore, their bonds are not reasonably calculated to achieve public safety and
court appearances. Consequently, Kentucky defendants' constitutional rights
are being violated.
An actual constitutional challenge by a defendant on Eighth Amendment
grounds would be difficult. The standard of review on appeal gives significant
deference to the trial court.'63 As long as the trial court considers the statutory
factors, its decision will likely be upheld. 6 4 However, this does not change the
fact that individual bond decisions are not actually being made by courts across
the state.The slim chance of a successful appeal should not preclude reform that
brings the bond decision process within the spirit of the Eight Amendment
and House Bill 463.
2. Section 2 ofthe Kentucky Constitution.-The application of Kentucky bail law
in the years following the enactment of House Bill 463 could also violate the
second section of the Kentucky Constitution.That section states, "[a]bsolute and
arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in
a republic, not even in the largest majority."' Courts have interpreted Section
2 "to embrace the traditional concepts of both due process and equal protection
of the laws"-both fundamental fairness and impartiality.166 This includes
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
But, "[d]iscrimination or selectivity in enforcement is not, by itself, a
constitutional violation."16 In order to violate the due process prong of Section
2, "unequal treatment must amount to a conscious violation of the principle of
uniformity."1 6 Such a violation occurs when state actions are so unreasonable

161 Ihis conclusion holds true in light of the statistical analyses set forth above. See discussion
supra Part III.B.
162 See discussion supra Part I.C.
163 See West, Changes in PretrialReleasefrom HB 463, supra note 67, at 3.
164 See id.

165 Ky. CoNsT. § 2.
166 Ky. Milk Mktg. v. Kroger Co., 691 S.W2d 893, 899 (Ky. 1985) (citing Pritchett v. Marshall,
375 S.W.2d 253,

258

(Ky. 1963)).

167 Commonwealth, Transp. Cabinet, Dep't. of Highways v. Express Mart, Inc., 759 S.W.2d
6oo, 6o (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
168 Standard Oil Co. v. Boone Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 562 S.W2d 83, 85 (Ky. 1978).
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that they appear arbitrary. 69 Reasonableness is a matter of degree determined
on the particular facts of a case.' 70
In this instance, when courts grant unequal access to pretrial release by
over-utilizing the subjective safety valve and ordering release in an uneven
manner across the state, they are categorizing defendants based upon geographic
location of arrest and thereby consciously violating the principle of uniformity.
Dangerous or flight prone defendants are having their bond decided in a different
manner across the state with no reasonable explanation for the deviation. 'This
sort of geographic categorization would seem to be present in all adjudications
of state statutes by virtue of the structure of the court system and its division
by county. But Kentucky's Supreme Court has previously struck down explicit
statutory language that resulted in geographic categories.17' The court in
D.F v. Codell found a statute to be unconstitutional because it premised
revocation of high school dropouts'drivers'licenses on the educational facilities
available in the dropout's county. 72 The court found that such geographic
categorization was not reasonably related to the legitimate aims set forth in
the legislation.'17 It is obviously different to argue that application of a neutral
statute-like House Bill 463- unconstitutionally categorizes geographically,
but, "[w]hether the proceeding is an attempt to enforce an invalid law or to
enforce a valid law in an invalid manner makes no logical difference."174
However, other challenges on selective enforcement grounds have required
flagrant conduct-beyond mere categorization-to be successful.' 7s These cases
vary in their theories between substantive due process and equal protection
analyses, but all use the same rational basis test. That test requires the rationale
for selective enforcement to be reasonably related to the goals of the statute."'
169 Express Mart, 759 S.W2d at 6o (citing Ky. Milk Mktg., 691 S.W.2d at 899).
170 Id.
171

D.F. v. Codell, 127 S.W.3 d 571, 577-78 (Ky. 2003).

172 See id.
173 See id at 578.

174 City of Ashland v.Heck's, Inc., 407

S.W2d 421,423 (Ky. 1966).
See Express Mart, 759 S.W.2d at 602 (denying a challenge of geographic selective
enforcement because the enforcing agency made its decision based upon available resources and a
higher percentage of legal actions in a certain district does not amount to selective enforcement);
Exec. Transp. Sys. LLC v. Louisville Reg'l Airport Auth., 678 F.Supp. 2d 498,5to (WD. Ky. 200)
(denying an allegation of unequal treatment by an administrative agency in choosing transportation
contractors because the parties were not similarly situated); Standard Oil Co. v. Boone Cnty. Bd.
of Supervisors, 562 S.W.2d 83, 84-85 (Ky. 1978) (denying challenge of selective enforcement because
there was no evidence that the agency in charge of tax collection knew that similarly situated
properties were also taxable); Davis v. Commonwealth, Nos. 2002-CA-ooo 469 -MR, 2oo 3 -CA002029 -MR, 2004 WL 2149128 at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2004) (denying challenge of selective
enforcement of a statute controlling the appearance of junkyards due to a failure to identify
an invidious purpose for enforcement). But see City of Ashland, 407 S.W2d at 424 (sustaining a
challenge of unequal enforcement when Sunday closing law enforced against only one retailer in
twenty-five years but not other violators).
176 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
175
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The construction of Section 2, a combination of equal protection and due
process safeguards, lends itself to this confusion. The precedent is such that
the only difference between the two theories would seemingly be the remedy
sought-either a change in the procedure utilized or a change in the treatment
of the category created by selective enforcement.
As shown above, the rational basis test is notoriously difficult to overcome
for parties bringing suit against the government. '7 Here, the challenged
county could argue that the differences in the utilization of the safety valve
across the state should be characterized as a matter of degree influenced by
valid economic and political policy decisions. They could also argue that such
geographic categorization is just a product of the structure of the court system.
It would be difficult to rebut such claims due to the high bar a defendant must
meet on appeal."' It would also be difficult to prove, beyond use of statistics,
that there are similarly situated defendants treated differently due to their
location.1' Judges at initial appearances rarely, if ever, state their reasoning
for bond decisions in terms of what they would do if they were in a different
county or state, or whether a bond was chosen because their particular county
is tougher on crime than the others. Pretrial reports are also confidential, so it
would be difficult to prove another defendant was situated in the exact same
way as a plaintiff.s0 Any number of nuances could also be used to distinguish
individuals due to the plethora of required factors to be considered in the
bond decision process."8 ' Nevertheless, as stated in the Eighth Amendment
analysis, this geographic categorization has no rational relation to the aims
bond decisions seek to achieve-mitigation of dangerousness and ensuring
appearance in court.'82 It is unlikely that those counties with low release rates
have less dangerous defendants than those with high release rates. A statistical
analysis of the outcomes supports that conclusion, yet disparities remain.

ConstitutionalRemedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309,315-16 (1993); Codell,127 S.W.3 d at 578.
177 See Fallon,Jr.,supra note 176, at 316 (citing Edward L. Barrett, 7he RationalBasis Standard
for Equal Protection Review of Ordinary Legislative Classifcations, 68 Ky. L.J. 845, 86o (1980)
(characterizing the challenger's burden as virtually undischargeable)).
178 See West, Changes in PretrialReleasefrom HB 463, supra note 67, at 3.
179 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) (holding that statistics alone do not
support a cause of action for disparate treatment by showing a discriminatory purpose in the capital
punishment context).
s8o See Ky. R. CRIM. P. 4.08.
181 See discussion supra Part II.A.
182 See discussion supraPart IV.A.i.
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B. Other ConstitutionalIssues
1. ConsiderationofDangerousness.-Threeprinciples have traditionally governed
the early American bail system at the federal level.1 3 First, bail should not be
1
excessive."
Second, a right to bail exists in non-capital cases.ss Third, bail is
meant to ensure the appearance of the accused at trial. 1 6 Kentucky protects
the first two principles in its constitution, but the third principle has seen
change at the state and federal levels."' The first major Supreme Court case
concerning the administration of bail unequivocally stated that "the modem
practice of requiring a bail bond or the deposit of a sum of money subject
to forfeiture serves as additional assurance of the presence of an accused."' 8
As stated above, any bail set higher than reasonably calculated to fulfill that
purpose is excessive under the Eighth Amendment.'" However, a case decided
four months after Stack clarified the Court's position. The Supreme Court in
Carlson v. Landon held that the right to bail is fundamental but not absolute.' 9
The Court's holding left the door open to a limitation of the right to bail by
the legislature.' 9'
The states and Congress stepped through that open door in the years
following Stack and Carlson. Concern about crime committed by defendants
released prior to trial and the "tough on crime" culture of the 1970's ushered in
reforms that allowed judges to consider future dangerousness in bond decision
making.192 The first law that made community safety an equal consideration
to future court appearance was the District of Columbia Court Reform and
Criminal Procedure Act of 1970.'" Between 1970 and 1984, many states
followed suit by including dangerousness considerations in their bail statutes.194
Congress addressed the issue at the federal level with the passage of the Bail
Reform Act of 1984.1s The 1984 Act amended the Bail Reform Act of 1966
"to include consideration of danger in order to address the alarming problem
183 TIMOTHY

R.

ScHNACKE ET AL., PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE HISTORY OF BAIL AND

PRETRIAL RELEASE 5 (2010) (citing SPURGEON KENNEDY ET AL., PRETRIAL SERVS. RES. CTR.,
PRETRIAL RELEASE AND SUPERVISION PROGRAM: TRAINING SUPPLEMENT 2 (1997)).
184

Id.

185 Id.
186 Id.
187 See Ky. CONsT. §§ 16-17.

188 Stack v. Boyle,
189

342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).

Id.

190 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524,545-46 (1952); SCHNACKE, supra note 184, at 9.
191 Carlson,342 U.S. at 545-46; ScHNACKE, supra note 183, at 9.
192 SCHNACKE,

supra note

I83,

at 17.

193 Id.; United States. v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1323-24 (D.C. 1981) (upholding the D.C.

statute).
194 ScHNACKE,

supra note

183, at 17.

195 Id.; Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended at x8
U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (2012) and 18 U.S.C. § 3062 (2012)).
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of crimes committed by persons on release.""' In United States v. Salerno, the
Supreme Court upheld the dangerousness consideration in the 1984 Act. 97
"Nothing in the text of the Bail Clause limits permissible Government
considerations solely to questions offlight.""' The state response progressed and
"[b]y 1999, it was reported that at least 44 states and the District of Columbia
had statutes that included public safety, as well as risk of failure to appear, as an
appropriate consideration in the pretrial release decision."199
The popularity of allowing dangerousness considerations in bond decisions
should not be taken as evidence of its widespread support. Even in Salerno,
Justice Marshall wrote a vigorous dissent, calling such statutes "consistent with
the usages of tyranny and the excesses of what bitter experience teaches us to
call the police state."20 He also cited Justice Jackson to support his contention
that the majority's holding contravened the presumption of innocence:
"Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses
is . . . unprecedented in this country and . . . fraught with danger of excesses

and injustice."2 0' In fact, he cited the Government's retention of Salerno upon
a finding of dangerousness and subsequent pretrial release when he became
an informant as an "eloquent demonstration" of the inevitable abuses the
consideration of dangerousness would breed.20 2 He concluded:
Throughout the world today there are men, women, and children interned
indefinitely, awaiting trials which may never come or which may be a
mockery of the word, because their governments believe them to be
"dangerous." Our Constitution, whose construction began two centuries
ago, can shelter us forever from the evils of such unchecked power.... Today
a majority of the Court applies itself to an ominous exercise in demolition.
Theirs is truly a decision
which will go forth without authority, and come
203
back without respect.

Numerous secondary sources have also criticized the legality of the
consideration of dangerousness in bond decision making.20 Others have
196 SCHNACKE, supra note 183, at 17 (citing U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,742 (1987)).

197 United States v. Salerno, 48 U.S. 739,748 (1987)198 Id. at 754.

200

supranote 183, at 18 (citing EVIE LOTZE
12 (1999)).
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755 (Marshall,J., dissenting).

201

Id. at 766 (citing Williamson v. United States, 95 L.Ed. 1379, 1382 (1950) (opinion in

199 SCHNACKE,

ET AL., PRETRIAL SERVs. REs. CTR.,

THE PRETRIAL SERVICEs REFERENCE BOOK

chambers) (footnote omitted)).
202

Id. at 766-67.

Id. at 767.
Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Foreword: Preventive Detention - A Step Backward for Criminal
Justice, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 291, 296 (1971); Michael Harwin, Detainingfor Danger Under
203

204

the Bail Reform Act of 1984: Paradoxes of Procedure and Proof 35 ARIz. L. REV. 1091, 1121 (1993)

(identifying specific instances where the consideration of dangerousness has potentially become
unconstitutional); Curtis E.A. Karnow, Setting Bailfor Public Safety, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 2
(2008) (arguing that it is impossible to set bail that will account for public safety in systems that do
not allow preventive detention); Thomas E. Scott, PretrialDetention Under the BailReform Act of
i9 84:An EmpiricalAnalysis,27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1,31-32 (1989) (calling for a clearer definition of
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criticized its practical application in addition to its constitutionality.2 0s One
Harvard study allowed participants to apply the aforementioned D.C. statute's
factors to attempt to predict future dangerousness. 206 The "hunch system" of
bond decision making, at best, was accurate 30% of the time-for every three
actual recidivists selected for detention, seven persons who would not have been
convicted of an offense were wrongly detained. The system also failed to capture
60% of the recidivists.2 0 1 In sum, the consideration of dangerousness is fraught
with constitutional and practical pitfalls. It treads on basic guaranteed rights
and lends itself to inaccurate use and abuse.
2. Use of Money Bail.-Even more generally, some sources have cited the
marked increase in the use and quantity of monetary release conditions as a
primary cause of the increase in pretrial detention nationwide.208 "Between
1990 and 2004, the pretrial release rate in felony cases fell from 66 percent
to 56 percent. Over that same period, the percent of cases where courts were
requiring felony defendants to post a money bail to be released from jail rose
from 54 percent to 69 percent." 209 In fact, there was a "nearly perfect inverse
relationship between the rise in the use of money bail and the decline in the
pretrial release rate." 210 The amount of money required for release also increased
over approximately the same time period. Average bail amounts increased by
over $30,000 between 1992 and 2006.211 In 2006, the "jail population in the
75 most populous U.S. counties had a median bail amount of $10,000."212
This increase in the use and amount of money bail has led to five out of six
defendants with a financial release condition unable to make the bond amount
set by the court.213 As stated above, while approximately 34% of defendants in
Kentucky received financial conditions of release in the year after House Bill
463's implementation, only about 4% of the total population actually secured
their release through satisfaction of their bail conditions.2 14
The use of money bail also raises a plethora of other constitutional issues.
First, studies show that it has a discriminatory impact on certain racial, ethnic,

dangerousness in the 1984 Act).
205 Ervin,supra note 204, at 296.

206 Id.
207

Id

208 SeeJUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 25, at io-i3; Clark, supra note 28, at 48
209 Clark,supra note 28, at 48.
210 Id.
211 JUSTICE

POLICY INST., supra note 25.

212 Id.
213 NAT'L INST. OF CORR., A FRAMEWORK FOR EVIDENCE-BASED DECISION MAKING IN
LOCAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 7 (2010) (citing THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE COURT PROCESSING STATISTICS,
19 9 0-204: PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS

214 See discussion supraPart III.B.

(2008)).
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and economic classes.215 Second, use of money bail is arbitrary-varying from
state to state and county to county.216 Third, the money bail system is subject to
exploitation by the wealthy.217 hese issues raise equal protection and due process
concerns.21 s Finally, there is a distinct lack of empirical evidence supporting the
argument that bail incentivizes appearance in court and public safety,219 raising
Eighth Amendment concerns.2 20
3. Kentucky, Dangerousness, and Money BaiL-Dangerousness and money bail

are being used in conjunction with the subjective exception in KRS section
431.066 as a means of sub rosa detention, thereby subverting the legislature's
intent with House Bill 463. Examples can be seen in some of the habeas corpus
actions and motions for bond reduction filed recently in Fayette County. In
one case, a low risk defendant was given a $3100 bail by the district court,
over Pretrial's recommendation, because his prior FTA indicated that he was
a flight risk and his prior charge for Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted
Felon indicated that he was a danger to the community.22 ' The defense attorney
argued that there was no actual violence in the defendant's past and that
Pretrial Services recommended that the defendant be released on his own
223
aapplication was rendered moot by a plea deal.
recognizance.222
In another case, a defendant charged with two counts of trafficking in
a controlled substance in the first degree was given a $28,000 bail that was
later reduced to a 10% bail 224 of $2800 when Pretrial Services amended her
215 JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 25, at 16; VANNOSTRAND, supra note

16, at

15; see MINTON,

supra note 26, at 6, tbl.6 (202).
216 JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 25, at 22-23 (discussing the use of money bail primarily
in states without pretrial risk assessments).
217 Jonathan Zweig, Note, ExtraordinaryConditions of Release Under the Bail Reform Act, 47
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 555, 555-57 (2010) (discussing the equal protection clause implications of the
exploitation of the federal bail system through the examples of Bernie Madoff and Marc Dreier
and the use of their significant wealth).

218 See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
219 JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 25, at 21 ("[Diespite the use of money bail at increasingly
higher amounts, failure to appear rates have not changed substantially. Whereas in the 19 6os and
'70s, the failure to appear rate among the most populous cities was 6-9 percent, the failure to appear
rate for felony cases was at 22 percent in 2oo6.").
220 See discussion supra Part IV.A.i.
221 See Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus,Medlockv. Ballard, No. 12-CI-oo3355 (Fayette
Cir. Ct. Ky. 2012). Incidentally, the prior FTA and prior conviction would have been accounted for
in the objective risk assessment. See KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, at 5222 See Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Medlock, No. i2-CI-00
33 55 -

223 See Medlock v. Ballard, No. s2-CI-oo3355.
224 A io% bail requires someone to post io% of the defendant's original bond to secure his
release, s28oo in this case. If the defendant does not appear in court, the person posting the bail may
be subject to pay the entire bail amount to the court, $28,000 here. KENTUCKY COURT OF JUSTICE,
PRETRIAL SERVICES FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, http://courts.ky.gov/courtprograms/
pretrialservices/Pages/FAQs.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
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classification from moderate to low risk.225 In making the determination, the
Fayette County district judge considered the fact that drugs were dangerous
to the community in general, that the defendant had been on probation ten
years ago, and that she had one prior FTA.2 26 The district judge also mentioned
on the record that Fayette County's circuit courts were growing weary of the
Department of Public Advocacy's challenges to district court bond rulings
in the wake of House Bill 463.227 The circuit court subsequently ordered the
defendant released on her own recognizance because a bond decision based
upon blanket statements about the dangerousness of drugs without more
specific facts was arbitrary.228
These are just a few examples of how the use of the subjective safety valve
in conjunction with subjective findings of dangerousness and money bail
circumvents the intent of House Bill 463 to decrease pretrial detention. Money
bail is being set at high amounts resulting in large percentages of defendants
unable to secure their freedom. The use of the dangerousness consideration
is making these bond decisions difficult to appeal. While not explicitly
unconstitutional, the system, in some cases, barely comports with the spirit of
House Bill 463. Minor adjustments to the use of dangerousness, money bail,
and the subjective exception, however, could bring Kentucky bond law in line
and measure up to the General Assembly's intent.
V.

SUGGESTED CHANGES

Kentucky's pretrial detention policy was significantly improved with the
implementation of House Bill 463. The legislative goals of increased release
rates and increased public safety are being achieved; however, there is also
significant room for improvement. Improvement has not been uniform across
the state.229 Resistance to objective release decision making has been firm in
some parts of the state. 230 The reasons for this resistance were laid out above:
First, Kentucky's bond decision process is duplicative. 231 Objective findings
on flight risk and dangerousness can be ignored upon subjective findings of
flight risk and dangerousness. 23 2 Ignoring the objective findings allows a court
to apply stricter release conditions, usually money bail, and subsequently

225 Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Estes v. Sabbatine, No. i-CI-oo 5 832 (Fayette
Cir. Ct. Ky. 2012).

226 Id. Coincidentally, the prior FTA and prior conviction would have been accounted for in
the objective risk assessment. See KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, at 5.

227 Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Estes, No. u1-CI-oo 5 832.
228 Id.

229
230
231
232

See discussion supra Part IV.A.i.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.i.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
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circumvent the legislature's intent to decrease pretrial detention.233 Second,
the consideration of dangerousness in Kentucky's bond decision process is
not without controversy.23 4 Though the Supreme Court ruled it constitutional,
scholars and judges both question its constitutionality and efficacy. Finally, the
use of money bail in general has also been broadly criticized.23 5 Statistics cited
above clearly indicate that its use is being abused.2 3 6
All of this analysis points toward a current Kentucky pretrial system that
is not strictly unconstitutional but employs contentious practices that result in
unfortunate outcomes for its citizens. For those reasons, the Kentucky bond
decision process should be developed further.
A. Decidingthe Type of Bond
In keeping with the legislature's intent to encourage evidence based practices,
the application of KRS section 431.066 should be changed in such a way that
restricts the use of the subjective safety valve.237 This Note proposes a decision
process that begins as it does now. A judge shall consider Pretrial Services'
objective recommendation in the bond determination phase if required. If a
judge subjectively finds that the defendant is a flight risk upon a finding of facts,
she should be able to disregard Pretrial Services' recommendation and apply a
bond in accordance with the relevant statutes. Bond conditions could include
money bail. This is in line with the traditional purpose of bond conditions-to
assure appearance in court. 238
However, if the judge subjectively finds the defendant to be a danger
to the community, she should be required to choose only from any of the
available non-financialrelease options at her disposal. Subjective findings of
dangerousness should not be grounds for the application of money bail. 239 As
mentioned above, both the consideration of dangerousness and money bail can
be controversial and, therefore, should be limited.2 4 The potential for abuse of
these considerations is demonstrated by the disparate detention statistics across
Kentucky.241
The proposed modified procedure allows for more objective decision
making by protecting Pretrial Services' recommendations while preserving

233
234
235
236
237
238
239
RELEASE
240
241

See discussion supra Part II.A.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.i.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
See discussion supra Part IVB.2.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.i.
See NAT'L Ass'N OF PRETRIAL SERVS.

37, §

2.5(a) (3d ed. 2004).

See discussion supra Part IV.B.
See discussion supra Part III.B.

AGENCIES

(NAPSA),
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traditional judicial discretion.2 42 This helps ensure that bond decisions do not
become so automatic as to be unconstitutional. Subjective determinations of
danger and applications of money bail would no longer be a way to disregard
objective recommendations and circumvent the legislature's intent. Flight risk
determinations are also easier for the defendant to appeal because the subjective
decisions are usually based upon ascertainable facts, such as prior FTAs, the
distance a defendant lives from the courthouse, and ties to the community.
These discernible factual findings would help inform the court's analysis of a
defendant's flight risk.243
Some may argue that there are defendants so dangerous that only money
bail will reasonably assure their compliance with court orders should they be
released. 2 " However unlikely this may be, those critics could be satisfied with
a type of secondary hearing modeled after the procedure in the federal Bail
Reform Act.245 At the federal level, detention without bond is permissible upon
a showing that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the
community or any person by clear and convincing evidence.2 46 Like the federal
bond decision process, the hearing would be adversarial and occur after the
right to counsel attaches at the initial appearance. If the prosecutor could prove
by clear and convincing evidence that no other reasonable bond condition could
assure the defendant's compliance, then money bail could be applied.
B. Deciding the Amount ofBond

The confusion between KRS sections 431.066 and 431.525 should be
resolved.2 47 he overlapping factors in these statutes contribute to the confusion
in applying Kentucky's bond law. This confusion allows some districts to resist
the legislative intent of House Bill 463 by over-utilizing the subjective safety
valve. As discussed above, the only factor that does not implicitly overlap from
KRS section 431.525 when deciding the type of bond under KRS section
431.066 is the defendant's economic status. 248 All other factors contained
within KRS section 431.525 are either considered in the review of the pretrial
report, are constitutionally required to be considered, or do not inform the
inquiry required by KRS section 431.066.249 One way to eliminate confusion

See discussion supra Part IV.A.i.
243 But see infra app. C (showing no current correlation between retention rate and FTA rate).
244 It is worth noting that high-risk defendants' bond decisions are left to the discretion
of the judge. See KLUTE & HEYERLY, supra note 2, app. B, at 3. As a result, only low and moderate
defendants'bond decisions would be affected by the proposed statutory change.
245 See Goldkamp, supra note 132, at 55 (arguing for due process protections for state-level
defendants akin to the protections afforded at the federal level).
242

246

18 U.S.C. § 3 142(f)

(202).

247 See discussion supra Part II.A.
248 See discussion supraPart II.A.
249 See discussion supra Part II.A.
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would be to simply eliminate the reference to KRS section 431.525 from KRS
section 431.066(2). This would effectively cabin each section to its respective
inquiry: the type of bond and, if necessary, the amount of bail.
An additional explicit requirement to consider the defendant's economic
status when subjectively inquiring into the defendant's dangerousness
and likeliness to appear in court could also be added to the last sentence of
KRS section 431.066(2). Such an explicit clarification promotes individualized
bond decision making, as required by the Eighth Amendment and Kentucky law.
It would also provide additional protection to defendants from categorization
based on geography by curtailing the use of money bail as a means of sub rosa
detention.
Currently, ambiguity can be used as an explanation for not following
the statutory requirements and using the subjective safety valve in
KRS section 431.066. Clarification would promote consideration of
characteristics not measured in the objective pretrial recommendation. Some
of the duplicative analysis would be eliminated therefore removing some of the
arbitrariness from the bond decision process. This also allows the safety valve
to function as it was designed-as a tool to prevent unconstitutional, automatic
application of the law.
Furthermore, clarification would firmly place the individual economic status
factor in a statute where it could do more "work" for a defendant. As discussed
above, a defendant's inability to pay a bail does not make the amount of the
bail oppressive.250 This makes the defendant's economic status essentially moot
when deciding the amount of bail. Yet, any money bail is too often too much
for many defendants. 25 1 Consideration of individual economics when deciding
the type of bond would affect the process in a significant way.
For instance, a court considering a defendant's economic status could find
that the defendant is indigent and opt for highly stringent pretrial monitoring
in lieu of money bail. Alternatively, a court could find that the defendant is
wealthy and decide to apply money bail rather than non-financial conditions to
unburden the monitored conditional release program. Explicit consideration of
the individual's ability to pay also allows defendants to argue that non-financial
bond types, such as the MCR program, should have been applied in a particular
situation on appeal.
Some may argue that such clarification, mandating the court to consider
an individual's economic status, would unduly restrict or burden the trial
court by requiring a more detailed inquiry.This argument is mistaken because
the statutorily required information must be obtained for many defendants,
regardless of any added clarification in the KRS section 431.066. In fact, the
application of money bail statute currently requires consideration of personal

250 See discussion supra Part
251

H.A.

See discussion supra Part III.B.
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finances .252 For those defendants who are not given money bail, the information
is often already obtained by Pretrial Services. 'The agency is required to fill out
affidavits of indigency for the court to consider if the defendant requests a public
defender. 253 Therefore, for those defendants who will not receive money bail and
who do not request a public defender, a quick inquiry into the defendant's
finances hardly seems burdensome to the trial court. It is something that the
court is already accustomed to performing for other defendants.
CONCLUSION

An open interpretation of release laws allow for different needs in different
counties or in the particular circumstances in a given case.
[T]he reality is that we do not live in a world populated by a bunch of
"Houses" -the memorable doctor on the television series whose amazing
clinical intuition allows him to diagnose seemingly mystifying medical
conditions. In most contexts, the problem is not that we risk snuffing out
such creativity and insider acuity. Rather, the greater risk is that we will
subject people to practices that we have not bothered to show empirically do
more good than harm. 54

Disparities of the magnitude described in this Note, at every level, indicate
misuse of judicial discretion and inarticulate standards for pretrial release.
Advocates for the traditional and current system may argue that no portion
of the bond decision process used by Kentucky has been explicitly ruled
unconstitutional. However, Kentucky has never been a state that tolerated "Just
enough" for its criminal justice system. The legislature has made its intent to
lead once again known, and the fiscal state of the Commonwealth demands
action. A small change in Kentucky's bond decision process could result in great
good for the state.

252 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
253 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 431.525(I)(e) (West Supp. 2013).
§ 31.120 (West 2006); Ky. R. CRIM. P.4.06.

254 Cullen et al., supra note 77, at 21o.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

8o8

APPENDIX

[Vol.

A

O

C

a.

C

102

2013- 2014]

APPENDLX

809

PRETRIAL DETENTION IN KENTUCKY

B

Bluegrass Region (6/8/11 to 6/8/13)
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Jackson Purchase Region (6/8/11 to 6/8/13)
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Pennyrile Region (6/8/11 to 6/8/13)
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Ten Largest Counties by Population (6/8/11 to 6/8/13)
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Release Rate vs. FTA Rate (6/8/11 to 6/8/13)
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